field manual 100-6 information operations
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field manual 100-6 information operationsIt may not be available at this time, the URL may have changed, or we may be experiencing technical problems locating it. If possible, include the resource’s title and the URL that is no longer working. Our payment security system encrypts your information during transmission. We don’t share your credit card details with third-party sellers, and we don’t sell your information to others. Please try again.Please try again.Please try again. Please try your request again later. Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to apply it. Focused IO—synchronized with effective information management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance— enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for achieving information superiority. Users of FM 3-13 must be familiar with the military decision making process established in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; the operations process, established in FM 3-0, Operations; and commander’s visualization, described in FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. As the Army’s key integrating manual for IO, this manual prescribes IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also establishes doctrine and TTP for the IO elements of operations security and military deception. This manual implements joint IO doctrine established in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations; JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security; and JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. This manual establishes the following as the definition of IO used by Army forces: Information operations is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. This definition supersedes the definition of IO in FM 3-0.https://www.datgrocerydelivers.com/MI/userfiles/esu-switchpilot-manual.xml
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It is consistent with joint initiatives. The publication addresses IO doctrine in Part I and TTP in Part II. Part I also establishes Army operations security (OPSEC) and military deception doctrine. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Register a free business account To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzes reviews to verify trustworthiness. The chapter discusses the components of IO-- operations, relevant information and intelligence (RII), and information systems (INFOSYS). It concludes with a discussion of the six critical activities essential to a sound IO program: acquiring, using, protecting, exploiting, denying, and managing information and INFOSYS. Only when data is processed, that is, placed into a situational context, does it gain meaning and become, by definition, information. Knowledge is derived from information. Knowledge is information that has been tested and accepted as factual-- Untested beliefs, even when commonly held, differ from facts and are, in essence, opinions that can later prove to be wrong. Decisions based upon beliefs instead of facts are always at risk. Ideally, understanding a situation supports a commander in battlefield visualization and creates the conditions from which plans can be formed and effective actions taken. See Figure 2-1. Command decision-making will remain an art, not a science, even in the Information Age. A goal of IO is to narrow the gap between the art and science of command decision making. IW can support the overall US Government strategic engagement policy during peacetime, crisis, conflict, and postconflict.http://equinox-e.com/upload/UserFiles/file/esu2-400-manual.xml The ability of the US Government to influence the perceptions and decision making of others greatly impacts the effectiveness of deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts. In times of crisis, information can deter adversaries from initiating actions detrimental to interests of the US Government or its allies or detrimental to the conduct of friendly military operations. If carefully conceived, coordinated, and executed, IW-- It is specifically defined in CJCSI 3210.01 as-- The strategic goal of IW is to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's NII through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly INFOSYS. IW offers either side the chance to strike at a distance with relative safety. The Army has adopted this broader approach to recognize that information issues permeate the full range of military operations (beyond just the traditional context of warfare) from peace through global war. IO implement the IW policy for the land component commander. IO are defined as-- These activities take place within three interrelated components of IO: operations, RII, and INFOSYS. These components operate within a battlespace established by the MIE. (See Figure 2-2.) Army organizations conduct these IO activities as part of a dynamic, iterative process to support each component in an integrated full-dimensional operation. The aim of C2W is to influence, deny information to, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W is composed of two major branches: In the past, the primary warfighting objective was to concentrate physical and destructive combat power against the adversary's personnel and equipment, that is, tanks, airplanes, artillery, air defense. C2W is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. A paramount consequence of AirLand Battle was the intention to strike at reserve, reinforcing, and second-echelon forces.http://www.bosport.be/newsletter/dlec855w-manual This led in 1993 to an extended operational strategy of deep operations, with long-range weapons and Special Forces. Looking at high-value targets, deep operations strategy sought to destroy, degrade, deny, and disrupt critical C2 nodes as one of its primary objectives. While C2W has had a primarily offensive focus in the past, it now includes both C2-attack and C2-protect. Although these two disciplines of C2W have been practiced by successful armies since the beginning of recorded history, modern warfare with its emphasis on information and INFOSYS requires a new perspective. Three factors make C2W considerations critical when operating in today's environment: This places a premium upon the effective integration and synchronization of friendly physical destruction, EW, deception, and PSYOP to achieve maximum results when launching attacks. Without the complete and thorough integration and synchronization of the five C2W elements across both C2-attack and C2-protect, operational effectiveness will be reduced and potential vulnerabilities exposed. With effective C2-attack, we can either prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2 or leverage it to our advantage. RII plays a key role in C2-attack planning and operations, with the creation and maintenance of regional data bases on personal, historical, and cultural influences, intelligence-preparation-of-the battlefield (IPB), and battle damage assessments (BDA)--both soft and hard kill. The principal C2-attack approach for influencing the adversary's C2 is the synchronized application of the six information activities. C2-protect includes countering an adversary's propaganda to prevent it from affecting friendly operations, options, public opinion, and the morale of friendly troops. Whether in peace, conflict, or war, conducting military operations, consolidating combat power, and seeking information dominance are improved when leveraging CA support. Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations. For example, during Operation Restore Democracy, CA activities informed the local populace through the news media, public discussion, and PSYOP informational products and programs about the reestablishment of the legitimate Haitian government. This created an information exchange that promoted understanding of, confidence in, and positive perception of measures supporting military operations. CA elements support military operations by applying their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and civil information and by collecting information relevant to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). CA personnel have an intricate and important role in providing information during both the intelligence cycle and the operational planning cycle. CA planners must consider all available support and information to ensure successful completion of the CA mission. CA forces are well-suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support US objectives. National and international news media coverage plays a major role in quickly forming public debate and shaping public opinion. The news media serves as a public forum for the analysis and critique of goals, objectives, and actions. It can impact political, strategic, and operational planning, decisions, and mission success or failure. The reality of near real-time information, processed and transmitted at greater speeds and to wider audiences than in the past, has bridged the gap between what occurs on the ground and the goals and objectives of the National Military Strategy. Therefore, the public affairs officer (PAO) monitors public perceptions and develops and disseminates clear and objective messages about military operations. Moreover, commanders must involve themselves also in this dimension of IO. PA personnel-- This information also helps soldiers combat the effects of enemy propaganda or misinformation. Commanders, through their PAO, initiate, direct, and emphasize internal information topics and programs. Every soldier must receive information specific to the operation through command channels and world, national, and local news. The media is an important information channel to the American public; however commanders, staff officers, and soldiers must balance OPSEC and other operational requirements when working with the media. Leaders understand the importance of achieving a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information to both internal and external audiences. Leaders integrate PA into their decision-making process by considering it in their assessment of the situation and development of courses of actions, plans, and orders. Commanders ensure that PA operations are synchronized with other combat functions and promote early coordination of PA, CA, and PSYOP functions during the planning process. A continual exchange of information must exist during execution as well. Although each function has a specific audience, information will overlap, making it crucial that messages are deconflicted and coordinated. The drive to know as much as possible about their own forces--location, combat effectiveness, current activity--and the enemy's--location, disposition, combat effectiveness, intended actions--has been a durable characteristic of successful commanders, regardless of the time period or nationality. Today, commanders operate in an environment increasingly marked by the rapid flow of information and decisions among strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These factors are complicated by an explosive expansion in the opportunities for access and the manipulation of operationally relevant information by the wide array of individuals, organizations, and systems found in the GIE. Intelligence, the commander's source of relevant information about the adversary, takes on increased, even crucial, importance in the Information Age. Because IO give battlespace global connectivity, intelligence on current or potential adversaries must be prepared on a global scale. Interaction with the MIE requires timely intelligence about many aspects of current or potential adversaries, to include cultural, political, and commercial aspects. Information allows the commander's decision-execution cycle to function and gives direction to actions by the force to accomplish their operational missions. The commander operates within the GIE, adjusting his MIE to enhance his situational awareness as appropriate for the operation at hand. The commander's operational requirements dictate the critical information requirements, which in turn dictate the RII collection effort. To be effective, the unit's intelligence cycle must be managed to provide information based on the priorities in the concept of operations. A key to successful IO is an accurate IPB focused on the MIE. During combat operations intelligence analysts must continually perform an information-oriented BDA to ensure IO remain effective. RII support to IO begins in peacetime and must be continuous throughout all phases of an operation or campaign. First, communications connectivity allows broadcast dissemination of information. This incorporates direct downlink of raw data from multiple sensors to multiple echelons simultaneously and the broadcast of finished information products from theater, departmental, or national production agencies to deployed forces. Information can be provided on a push or pull mode to deployed units. Advances in sensors, processors, and communicators are combining to provide detailed, timely reconnaissance and surveillance of almost any place on the globe. Both military and nonmilitary sources provide information that can be used to produce RII. Open-source intelligence or reporting will provide much order of battle (OB) and technical data. An OB focused on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) includes data collection and information processing systems, command systems, and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems. An IPB based on C4I focuses on an adversary's decision requirements. These are selected in relation to the friendly commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and describe in detail the decisions the adversary must make to conduct his battle plan. From there, the focus shifts to the information sources that feed or influence the adversary's decisions such as sensors, the platforms on which they are deployed, and their supporting C3 systems. The results should include data on current operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. RII as a component of IO is addressed in detail in Chapter 4. Automation has made great advances in information processing, but human beings remain the most effective system for determining relevance and fusing information. INFOSYS are those means that enable commanders and their staffs to-- The Army's integrated architecture of advanced INFOSYS maximizes the C2 capabilities of land forces in all operating environments. The road map for exploiting current and future information technologies to enhance Army operations is the Army Enterprise Strategy (AES). The AES and other initiatives like C4I for the Warrior are reinforcing the important contributions INFOSYS make to information-based warfare. Of particular importance is the evolution of the Army's comprehensive information architecture with its three supporting initiatives focused on operational, system, and technical architectures. When completed, this initiative will create a common operating environment (COE) of standardized, interactive systems and templates for the collection, storage, and manipulation of all Army data bases. It will show what we do, what information we need to do it, and how often we need to exchange information within the force. It uses an organizational context to show system allocation and network structures and helps document engineering decisions, such as specific information protocols and bandwidth. It specifies the permissible standards for designing C4I capabilities and is critical to the creation and maintenance of interactive systems. INFOSYS support operations globally with communications automation architectures, both space- and terrain-based. However configured, INFOSYS can provide such support with a minimum of physical repositioning to support C2, whether in a strategic deployment phase or moving for a tactical attack. Both military and commercial INFOSYS play important roles in this architecture. The migration of the current Army Command and Control System (ACCS) to the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) incorporates a common C2 operating environment at all echelons. This integration of modern INFOSYS with our tactical units continues to enhance their connectivity, decision-making, and, ultimately, lethality, survivability, and the ability to control the tempo of operations. Advanced weapons system and sensor technologies based on interoperability, digitization, and spectrum supremacy will contribute directly to improved effectiveness of the force. Chapter 5 discusses the Army INFOSYS architecture in detail. It must acquire, process, distribute, and protect information, while selectively denying or distributing it to its adversaries and or allies. When effectively executed, these critical activities supplement the human skills of battle command, speed decision making, minimize or eliminate uncertainty, focus combat power, help protect the force, harness organizational capabilities, link the MIE to the GIE, and enhance situational awareness for soldiers and leaders. These activities apply to both information and INFOSYS (hardware, people, organizations, and processes). Although listed sequentially, these activities are concurrent and seamless in their application (see Figure 2-3 ). Initial questions include-- The nature of that information includes its accuracy, timeliness, and its overall relevance to the situation in consonance with the CCIR. Considering the available information sources and the nature of that information, commanders develop technical and tactical plans to acquire critical information. Collection of information about adversaries and the environment is managed through the RII collection cycle. The commander alone decides what information is critical based on the mission, his experience, and the higher echelon commander's intent. The staff may recommend CCIR to the commander as-- Information is also acquired using a more general information collection cycle focusing on gathering relevant information from other sources and influences in the MIE. The information needs of the commander are not answered by a single source, but by-- Events can make an item of information irrelevant or so unrepresentative as to portray a highly inaccurate picture of reality. Information beyond a certain age will detract from the commander's situational awareness. Standard operating procedures (SOPs), CCIRs, OPLANs, and collection plans must all be sensitive to perishability of information. Moreover, from a technical perspective, INFOSYS managers must respond by managing the systems and information to enable assured, timely communication and decision making. The commander expands his thinking to include all INFOSYS and organizations accessible in the GIE. Once the data is acquired, analyzed, and collated, the information is used to update and validate a common situational awareness. This common situational awareness provides the basis to refine, continue, or adjust decisions, plans, and operations. They seek to integrate information at all echelons and plan the use of all available information, regardless of the source. A unit must make use of both organic and nonorganic INFOSYS. Nonorganic systems are either DOD governmental or non-DOD (GIE). Use of other US Government systems, (DOD and non-DOD) is coordinated with higher commands. It reflects the lessons learned since that time from combat operations, teachings, exercises, wargames, and comments from the Army in the field. Central aspects of AirLand Battle doctrine--its recognition of the importance of the operational level of warfare, its focus on the seizure and retention of the initiative, and its insistence on the requirement for multiservice cooperation--remain unaltered. The basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine--initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization--are reemphasized. Create a free account Representative 21.9 APR (variable). Credit offered by NewDay Ltd, over 18s only, subject to status. Terms apply.Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required. Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.Edition (1 Sept. 1991) Portland, Or.To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. It also analyses reviews to verify trustworthiness. They are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. Today's force-projection Army recognizes the following nine principles of war. The ultimate objectives of operations other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, they too must be clear from the beginning. The linkage, therefore, between objectives at all levels of war is crucial; each operation must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war. To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with fingers of an open hand. Mass must also be sustained so the effects have staying power. Thus, mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him. This results from the proper combination of combat power with the proper application of other principles of war. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy rife. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. When the time comes for action, all parts must act. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures. Risk is inherent in war; however, commanders must not be overly cautious. To be successful, commanders must take necessary, calculated risks to preserve the force and defeat the enemy. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Rapid advances in surveillance technology and mass communication make it increasingly difficult to mask or cloak large-scale marshaling or movement of personnel and equipment. The enemy need not be taken completely by surprise but only become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, effective intelligence, deception, application of unexpected combat power, operations security (OPSEC), and variations in tactics and methods of operation. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity is especially valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and troop leading at all echelons and permits branches and sequels to be more easily understood and executed. A tenet is a basic truth held by an organization. The fundamental tenets of Army operations doctrine describe the characteristics of successful operations. All training and leadership doctrine and all combat, combat support, and combat service support doctrine derive directly from, and must support, the fundamental tenets. The US Army believes that its five basic tenets are essential to victory. In and of themselves they do not guarantee victory, but their absence makes it difficult and costly to achieve. Applied to the force as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to commanders' operational purposes and tempos, while retaining freedom of action. It means depleting the enemy's options, while still having options of their own. This requires leaders to anticipate events on the battlefield so that they and their units can act and react faster than the enemy. Applied to individual soldiers and leaders, initiative requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent. It is as much a mental as a physical quality. Greater quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy vulnerabilities. Forces may need to concentrate repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action, another has taken its place, disrupting the enemy's plans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piecemeal responses. This process of successive concentration against locally weaker or unprepared enemy forces enables smaller forces to disorient, fragment, and eventually defeat much larger opposing formations. To achieve such a defeat, leaders and units must be agile. These factors vary by echelon and by constraints given to commanders. What is most important, however, is the fact that in any operation the Army must have the ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of the battlefield. This ability highlights the joint nature of deep operations, which means participation by the other services. For example, integrating the activities of intelligence, logistics, and fire support with maneuver leads to synchronized operations. It means that the desired effect is achieved by arranging activities in time and space to gain that effect. Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, the massed effects of combat power at the point of decision. Commanders must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatility implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Army units are capable of rapidly realigning forces and refocusing on widely divergent missions. Disciplined units, highly trained and competent throughout the range of military operations, are the wellspring of versatility. Overwhelming combat power is the ability to focus sufficient force to ensure success and deny the enemy any chance of escape or effective retaliation.