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enlisted info field manualsUpgrade to a different browser to experience this site. These manuals contain all the important information required by the U.S army. The information about what to cook and how to cook and information like how to use particular weapons can be found in army field manuals. Few years back, the quantity of these field manuals was around 650. These manuals contain guidelines for army officials, soldiers and subordinates. A wide range of topics is covered by these field manuals, such as FM 3-0 is about army operations, FM 1 is about U.S army, and FM 8-50 is about the prevention and medical management of laser injuries. When we look inside these manuals, we find that they look a lot like the school text books with some illustrations in the form of charts, tables and hand drawn stuff. These manuals also possess a preface and acknowledgement section. Moreover, to make manuals easy to understand, the content inside them is divided into chapters according to specific topics. Each chapter is then further divided into sub headings and bullet points which make these field manuals comfortable to read and understand. Many websites allow the free download of the publicly available filed manual copies. However, not all the manuals are free of cost. Some other manuals can be purchased through online shops. About 40 to 50 field manuals are readily available at headquarter of a battalion. Every army office or headquarter possess manuals on general topics and some particular FMs that are relevant to that headquarter. One of these informative field manuals includes FM 7-8. It contains all the necessary information regarding tactics and operation techniques for small squads. Each platoon and platoon leader keeps a copy of FM 7-8 with them all the time. The important field manuals like the FM 7-8 are also available in pocket-size versions so that army fellows can keep them in their pocket all the time. This FM is only accessible by army interrogators at the Intelligence Interrogation.http://www.ibervillecompanies.com/userfiles/discrete-and-combinatorial-mathematics-5e-solution-manual.xml
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The ways and procedures for obtaining information from criminals and the rules of interrogation are covered in this handy manual. These are intended to be short, comprised readings to cover only the most pertinent information. Field Manuals (FMs) would continue to serve as the most comprehensive reference manuals in the new series. This regulation (April 2015) prescribes Department of the Army policy for proper wear and appearance of Army uniforms and insignia, as worn by officers and enlisted personnel of the Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve, as well as by former Soldiers. In addition to the updated regulation there is also the Uniform Policy Leaders Training which provides visual references to the updates. This publication implements DODD 6130.3 and DODD 6130.4. It provides information on medical fitness standards for induction, enlistment, appointment, retention, and related policies and procedures. This change implements policy to provide four methods for Reserve Officers' Training Corps disestablishment (voluntary, contract, Effective Management Program, and Program Efficiency Closures). Chapter 2-2 outlines the military service obligation for Active Duty Officers. The time served in uniform out of the total 8 year commitment is based off of scholarship or non-scholarship. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with Us Army Field Manual 21 20. To get started finding Us Army Field Manual 21 20, you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed. Our library is the biggest of these that have literally hundreds of thousands of different products represented. I get my most wanted eBook Many thanks If there is a survey it only takes 5 minutes, try any survey which works for you. The total number of FMs, however, would be reduced to 50, covering core concepts and the FMs would be limited to a main body text of no more than 200 pages.http://www.conditum.nl/userfiles/discovery-workshop-manual-td5.xml All remaining knowledge would be transitioned to a new lower-level series of publications, called Army Techniques Publications (ATPs). Site maintained by: John Pike. Since post 9-11, U.S. military service members have been deployed in the global war on terrorism. This study attempted to determine the effectiveness of the FM 3-11 in detecting, deterring or preventing a human-borne with bioagent (HBBA) terrorist breach at an entry control point (ECP). The return rate was greater than 75.0 ; however, many of the respondents failed to meet the inclusion criteria. Consequently, only 26 questionnaires were included in the sample. Results The results revealed that while over 60.0 of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that biointelligence, the deployment of biodetectors and the use of biowarning systems could be effective in preventing an ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent, the use of protective equipment and immunization to decontaminate service members or other TTPs would never prevent a breach. A large percentage of respondents claimed that soldiers at the ECP lacked the devices or the knowledge to detect an HBBA at an ECP, and 72.0 suggested modifying current ECP TTPs to include education, training and equipment for security personnel at military base ECPs. Conclusion If obtained from appropriate sources and communicated to the personnel at the ECP in an effective or timely manner, the possible effectiveness of certain TTPs in the FM 3-11, specifically FM 3-11.86 (intelligence), might increase. Of these manuals, the FM 3-11 series is the most specific to biological agent preparation and reactions; thus, it is a focus for critique in this study. This multi-service tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP) manual focus on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents.http://fscl.ru/content/bowflex-pro-workout-manual Immediately, questions from members of press reflected fears about the possibilities of these military men and women becoming infected with the virus and becoming “vectors” of transmission back to the USA. The lack of such an attack does not rule out the future use of such an insidiously deadly form of terrorism to threaten the U.S. security and its forces stationed abroad. Should a terrorist group attempt this route of attack, what measures are in place to check or prevent a breach of an FOB’s ECP. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the current DoD FM 3-11 field manual series, which is specifically designed to prepare for and respond to a biological agent attack, would be effective for detecting, deterring and degrading a terrorist with a BA at a military base ECP. Method Respondents The target populations selected for this pretest were U.S. military personnel (primarily) and other individuals in the security profession (secondarily) with combat experience. The questionnaire was distributed to respondents in the selected organizations, and a single-blind approach was used to ensure that no direct contact occurred between the respondents and investigator. However, in some situations, there was direct contact between prospective respondents (those willing to participate) and the investigator, who later offered these respondents hard copies of the questionnaires, along with consent forms. Electronic copies were also sent to respondents who requested the questionnaire and consent forms in an electronic format. Data collection Data from the target population was collected with the validated survey tool. Only those questionnaires that were fully completed or had no more than four missing items and in which the respondents demonstrated knowledge or training on antiterrorism ECP TTPs were accepted for analysis.http://miriammcconnonart.com/images/compal-fl92-service-manual.pdf Data analysis Data collected were analyzed using the Statistical Product and Service Solution (SPSS) statistical software (Base Grad Pack shrink wrap version 21.0) for both descriptive and scale reliability—Cronbach’s alpha analysis. Delimitations of study This research study focused primarily on military combat settings. It did not reveal or expose details about classified military TTPs, analyze or review specifics of the military TTPs that focus on reaction and recovery from terrorist attacks on combat bases, or reveal exact names of combat bases and their coordinates or the specifics of their activities. The study was limited to the periods witnessed by one of the investigators while on tour of duty in Afghanistan as a force protection vulnerability assessor for the U.S. Army Central Command. The respondents’ privacy was protected and no identifying personal information was collected. Results Only questionnaires that were at least 95.0 complete and respondents who demonstrated personal knowledge of or training in any anti-terrorism (AT) tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) were included in the analyses. The return rate from those who were willing to participate and signed the consent form was 75.0 . After eliminating those who did not fit the required criteria, 26 questionnaires that could be subjected to analysis remained. This reluctance ultimately affected the response rate, the number of respondents, and eventually the sample size of this pretest study. This small sample size made it impossible for the researchers to make a broad generalization or inference from the findings of the study. However, it is important to emphasize that the results tend to show that the ECPs of combat FOBs are vulnerable to breach by a terrorist carrying biological agents. Additionally, these perceptions come from people who have generally been recently deployed and have ECP TTP experiences in a combat environment. Field experience is an important factor in these positions, as individuals who have not been deployed lack the necessary readiness. Over 92 of the respondents in this study whose questionnaires were completed, returned and analyzed were combat veterans with a minimum of two tours of deployment and with ECP TTP personal experience. Descriptive data of respondents More than eighty percent (80.8 ) of respondents whose questionnaires were selected and analyzed were in the military; 15.4 were retired military, and 3.8 were from Homeland Security. All of the respondents claimed to have had personal knowledge of or training in anti-terrorism. Respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of CBRN TTP Slightly more than forty-six percent (46.1 ) of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the notion that immunizing every resident of a combat post will assist in the detection of a terrorist with a BA at the ECP. Additionally, 53.8 strongly disagreed or disagreed that immunization would prevent the breach of a combat ECP by a terrorist with a BA (Fig. 1 ). Fig. 1 The respondents’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of immunization protocols against a BA breach at an ECP Full size image More than seventy-six percent (76.9 ) agreed or strongly agreed that the deployment of biological agent collectors or detectors in the area of operation (AO) would prevent an ECP breach by a terrorist with a bioagent. Finally, 61.5 agreed or strongly agreed that a biological warfare attack warning system would prevent the breach of an ECP by an HBBA terrorist (Fig. 2 ). Fig. 2 The respondents’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of biointelligence protocols against a BA breach at an ECP Full size image Approximately fifty-five percent (53.8 ) of the respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the notion that current individual protective equipment would prevent the breach of a combat ECP by a terrorist carrying a bioagent. Fifty-seven percent (57.6 ) strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement that wearing protective gear would prevent the breach of a combat ECP by a terrorist carrying a bioagent (Fig. 3 ). Fig. 3 The respondent’s perceptions regarding the effectiveness of personal protective equipment protocols against a BA breach at an ECP Full size image Responses regarding BA devices at ECPs Fifty percent of the respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement that soldiers at the ECP had devices, such as the explosive trace detector spray kits employed for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that could effectively detect traces of BAs on a person at the ECP. Similarly, 53.8 either strongly disagreed or disagreed that every soldier at the ECP is adequately knowledgeable about how to look for BAs or what to look for. Discussion This preresult indicated that 61.5 of the respondents, the majority of whom were combat veterans, think it is either possible or very possible for a terrorist carrying a biological agent to successfully breach a combat ECP undetected. The fact that the analysis indicated that over 60.0 of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that biological intelligence, the deployment of biological collectors or detectors and biowarning signals would be effective in preventing the breach of a combat ECP by an HBBA terrorist tends to indicate limited knowledge. Regarding the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and immunization as currently practiced under the CBRN TTPs, over 50 and 45 of respondents, respectively, strongly disagreed or disagreed that these methods would effectively prevent an HBBA terrorist from breaching an ECP. Usually, PPEs are donned after intelligence has indicated a possible threat, generally in war theater and not necessarily at the ECP, while immunization is performed to prevent infections based on the threat of a specific agent that intelligence has identified. It is striking to note that the respondents claimed that soldiers are not educated regarding searching for BAs at the ECP, nor are they equipped with the necessary devices to detect a BA on a person or a vehicle, such as the equipment employed for IED searches. While the authors acknowledge the limitations of this study, the perceptions of these respondents remain very authentic because they have firsthand combat ECP TTP experiences. During this study, many of the respondents suggested the need for authorities to educate soldiers about bioterrorism and HBBA terrorists and the need for changes in current ECP TTPs to include procedures that involve searching for BAs. The authors also acknowledges the difficulties that might arise with the development of devices that will effectively detect all BAs; however, the current situation of a complete absence of any BA-deterrent search practices and the use of obsolete biowarfare TTPs, as enumerated in the current FM 3-11 series, is troubling. The successful importation of the Ebola virus into Nigeria and the U.S.A. by individuals who knew they had had contact with people infected with the Ebola hemorrhagic virus remains the most parallel case and the best practical example of a human-borne with bioagent (HBBA), a human mobile bioagent device. Those individuals knew that they were infected, yet lied to the officials at the ECP to enter their intended countries. Those events tend to confirm the feasibility and possibility of an intentional and deliberate transportation of an infectious agent in-borne by humans across borders to cause or spread disease in another country. We cannot wait for another 9-11 attack before accepting that this form of terrorism is feasible, as the enemy has proven to be always to be one step ahead. It would be a mistake to confuse biowarfare with bioterrorism; the former requires sophisticated equipment that it is not very necessary in the latter, especially when there are willing volunteers seeking martyrdom. Significance of study A successful breach of a U.S. military combat post by a bioterrorist would not only have a devastating effect on morale, it would affect the military’s fighting strength and thus its missions. This study was the first to investigate the possible vulnerability of combat FOBs to a breach at the ECP by an HBBA terrorist under current military measures. Limitations of the study This study employed a time-specific, cross-sectional design for the purpose of determining perceptions that are critical to ECP security at a combat post by those who are charged to ensure it. The restrictions placed on the target respondent organizations’ populations, the classification limitations placed on military TTPs, and possible effects on the participants’ responses to the questionnaire are other limitations. Conclusion If obtained from proper sources and communicated to the personnel at the ECP in an effective or timely manner, the effectiveness of certain TTPs outlined in the FM 3-11 - specifically FM 3-11.86, intelligence - might increase. The fact remains that while there are drills on soldiers’ reactions to a biological attack, there is no specific training for the ECP, such as how to search for biological agent in or on a person at the ECP. This explains how the retired air force colonel described by Hylton (29) was able to get a modified anthrax bacillus into the White House and how an Afghani worker was able to enter an FOB and serve food to soldiers despite having an infectious skin problem. At ECPs, therefore, the current FM 3-11 methods would be very ineffective for preventing an HBBA breach. Biological threats and terrorism: Assessing the science and response capabilities: Workshop Summary 2012. Accessed 25 May 2015. 2. Galamas F. Profile bioterrorism: present and potential threats.In focus on bioterrorism 2005.Epidemiology of biowarfare and bioterrorism. In: Dembek ZF, editor. Textbook of military medicine: Medical aspects of biological warfare.Survivability and protective construction handbook. 5th ed. 2009. FOUO-For Official use only book. US army publication. For Official Use Only (FOUO). 2010. American national security. 6th ed. USA: The John Hopkins University Press; 2009. DoD base structure report fiscal year 2010 baseline (a summary of DoD’s real property inventory), 2010.. Accessed on 6 Jun 2013. 22. Totten RJ. Contagious disease, epidemics, national security, and U.S. immigration: Historical policy responses. 2012.. Accessed 22 April 2013. 23. Aerssens A, Vos DD, Pirnay J, Yansouni C, Clerinx J, Gompel AV, et al.The importance of militaries from developing countries in global infectious disease surveillance.The New York Times, October 26, 2011. (Reprint). ? Accessed 17 July 2012. 30. Alakpa GEU. Perceptions of military personnel: Analysis of the department of defense’s counter bioterrorism measures at the tactical level for the enhancement of civil security leadership, management, and policy. NJ. USA: Doctor of science dissertation. New Jersey City University; 2015. p. 186. Secur Manage, 2013; 37-42. 34. Fernandez M, Onishi N. U. S. patient aided ebola victim in Liberia. The New York Time, October 01, 2014a.. Accessed 2 October 2014. 35. Fernandez M, Onishi N. Scrutiny in Texas to detect whether ebola has spread. The New York Time, October 01, 2014b.. Accessed 2 October 2014. 36. Wilson J, Shoichal CE, Yan H. Ebola patients leaving Liberia was “unpardonable,” its president says. October 02, 2014.. Accessed 2 October 2014. 37. Lynch DM. The cost of amnesty: They come to America II. 2013. Film. Distributed by TV36 OLLC. 38. Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Jihadi chatter online, including on social media, about using ebola, poisons as weapon against the U.S. and the West”. Special Dispatch No 5854, of October 03, 2014.. Accessed 23 October 2014. Download references Acknowledgement Authors acknowledge the unquantifiable assistance of the various point of contacts at the military, security or institutions, in the dissemination of the questionnaire and consent forms to willing respondents. The Contributions of Mrs. Abieyuwa Alakpa, who went with the corresponding author to every possible institution selected for this study and that of James Smith, are here acknowledged.Additional information Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Authors’ contributions AG, was the main researcher, involved in the design of the survey tool, appearing before the New Jersey City University’s IRB and conception of the study. He wrote the manuscripts, initiated contacts for dissemination of questionnaire and analysis of data collected. CJ, he was involved with the reading of the manuscripts, study, with mentoring the corresponding author and providing the support for both analysis and realization of the mission. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Rights and permissions The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated. Download citation Received: 10 August 2015 Accepted: 08 December 2015 Published: 22 December 2015 DOI: Keywords DoD FM 3-11 Bioterrorism Breach of Combat ECP HBBA terrorist Security personnel Perception. The Occupational References and the Professional Military Knowledge References listed on that online bibliography are attached to this site for your convenience. To retrieve a copy of the online bibliography, follow the login instructions for COOL in the box to the left. This site is not an official site of COOL. It was created by the Department of Simulation, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, for the benefit of Sailors. Every effort will be made to keep the references current: however, it is ultimately each Sailor's responsibility to ensure he or she has the correct study material. This portal is provided as a supplemental source of information and is not meant to replace the Navy Advancement Center. The AAD resource has 9.2 million records for enlistments in the Army, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Women s Army Auxiliary Corps for the period 1938—1946. (111-SC-235858) Since their release through NARA's Access to Archival Databases (AAD) resource in May 2004, they have quickly become the most popular series of electronic records accessible through that resource. In the first year, thousands of AAD users performed more than 700,000 queries against the enlistment records file alone. With 9.2 million records for enlistments in the Army, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, this should come as little surprise. Those series contain more than 85 million historic electronic records created by more than 20 federal agencies on a wide range of topics.Following the fire, NPRC staff began identifying various series of records in NARA's custody that could assist them in reconstructing the lost basic service data. With these alternative sources, they could verify military service and provide a Certification of Military Service. The original punch cards, which contained basic information about enlistees at the time they entered Army service, were destroyed after microfilming, a common practice at that time. The NPRC began using a copy of the microfilm, but it presented some challenges. First, there were 1,586 rolls of microfilm, making manual review very difficult. Second, the punch cards were microfilmed in serial number order, making a search by name impossible. Third, a variety of punch card formats were used to record the enlistment data over time, and documentation of the various recording formats was hard to identify. In 1992, NPRC contacted NARA's Center for Electronic Records seeking some assistance with these challenges. Since the Bureau of the Census had already modified the original FOSDIC to process a series of 300 million microfilmed punch cards containing weather data, it responded affirmatively to the challenge presented by NARA. They successfully converted 1,374 of the 1,586 rolls, or 87 percent of the rolls of microfilm. The 212 remaining rolls containing approximately 1.5 million punch cards could not be converted because the card images were so dark that the scanner produced few, or no, usable records. In July 1994, the Bureau of the Census provided NARA with 1,374 data files (one per converted roll) on twelve 3480-class tape cartridges. NPRC received copies of the files, and they worked with Center for Electronic Records staff to identify the relevant War Department Technical Manuals containing technical documentation for the punch cards. Additional code tables and documentation continue to be identified among NARA's vast textual records holdings from World War II. Usually, the first read would contain the majority of data extracted from the card image. If all data could not be extracted, subsequent reads of the card image would result in additional records containing periods for characters successfully read on previous reads and alphanumeric characters for those interpreted on the current read. Varying interpretations of the same character may have occurred across the multiple reads. A blank record separates records or groups of records pertaining to an individual punch card image. Each file also contained a header record indicating the box and microfilm roll number and an end of file record.The large number of files still presented a logistical problem for identifying and searching for individuals, especially given the computer technology of that time. During the 1990s, NPRC collected code books and began an analysis of the records while NARA's St. Louis Data Systems Center created early edit programs in an attempt to merge best guesses into one record.In that year, staff took another look at the languished project, primarily because of the newly developed Access to Archival Databases (AAD) resource. They determined that to get the records ready for AAD, the project should be approached in two phases. The purpose was to reduce the number of files to a manageable number and allow for an overall evaluation of the scope, content, and quality of the electronic files. First, the 12 files were merged again into a single file. When we collapsed the multiple records, we were able to collapse only the data appearing in the FOSDIC second read of the punch card into the first read.It is this file that NARA makes available in the AAD resource. Each successive processing stage invariably introduced the chance of errors. In the case of the enlistment cards, they were designed to reflect, at the time of entrance into service, basic characteristics of each enlistee in the Army, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. The Adjutant General's Office used the punch cards to prepare tables analyzing occurrence of the various characteristics among individuals, enlisted or inducted, and to provide information for policies of demobilization. Therefore, given that the original intent of the program was to prepare statistical tables, less attention may have been paid to the proper spelling of names and accurate keypunching of personal data fields. The poor quality of the original microfilm caused most of the errors. To determine the level of error in the resultant file, NARA staff compared a random sample of the World War II Enlistment Records to the microfilmed punch cards. Of the sample records examined, 35 percent of them were found to have a scanning error. However, only 4.7 percent of the records had any character error in the name column, and only 1.3 percent had character errors in the serial number column. While a large number of records had other errors, they were minor. To help minimize these problems, NARA staff outlined some of the common errors in a set of Frequently Asked Questions for AAD. About 4 percent of the records contain data originally recorded on Enlisted Reserve Corps Statistical cards, and the bulk of those records are from 1942 and 1943. Over time the enlistment card format changed, and the height and weight or military occupational specialty categories were recorded in the same columns on the original punch cards. Because there is no easy way to distinguish original data recorded on the two The Frequently Asked Questions developed especially for the World War II Army Enlistment Records File also provide a number of helpful tips and hints about technical data characteristics of various fields. Results will be returned from the Army serial number file and from all other series in AAD where appropriate. This will bring up a page where the user may search these records. Type the serial number in the search box without hyphens, submit the search, and a summary of the record with that serial number will appear.Users should note that searches are not case sensitive even though entries are uppercase in the file. The name column includes all possible parts of a name: surname, space, first name, space, middle initial, and SR, JR, 3rd, etc. For example: McAffee was recorded as MC AFFEE, but Mcaffee was recorded as MCAFFEE. Names with apostrophes, like O'Brien, usually do not have a space between the prefix and the rest of the name, i.e., OBRIEN. Van Heusen is recorded as VAN HEUSEN. When the full name was longer than the number of characters available in the name column, as much of the surname as possible is in the column, and initials were used for the first name. AAD also allows for using wildcards in searches so that users can identify records even when unsure of name spelling or format.