dhc-6 series 400 aircraft flight manual
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dhc-6 series 400 aircraft flight manualViking has worked with Aircraft Technical Publishers (ATP) to provide up-to-date, digital versions of the technical libraries that are easily accessible and available by subscription. This list is for reference purposes only. To purchase a subscription to a digital library, please contact Aircraft Technical Publishers. To obtain a copy of a particular service bulletin or for more information, please contact our Technical Publications Administrator.Winner of the James C. Floyd award for outstanding contributions to Canadian aerospace, Viking celebrates its 50th anniversary in 2020. Viking is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and Type Certificate holder for all out-of-production De Havilland Canada aircraft and the Canadair Amphibious Aerial Firefighting aircraft fleet. Longview Aviation Capital, through its subsidiaries, holds the Type Certificates for the entire original product line of the De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Company. Together these companies continue to make strides in manufacturing and modernizing versatile, fuel efficient and environmentally responsible turboprop aircraft for use around the world. All rights reserved. Footer Menu Copyright Credits Feedback Terms of Use Email Communication Cookie Policy Privacy Policy Close Translate Contact Search What would you use your Viking aircraft for. Only the first ten pages (on 116) are available for non-registered users. Free registration grants access to the whole document. In response, we have issued some transportation-related measures and guidance. Please check if any of these measures apply to you. If you cannot get through, please contact us by email. It describes an example of an acceptable means, but not the only means, of demonstrating compliance with regulations and standards. This AC on its own does not change, create, amend or permit deviations from regulatory requirements, nor does it establish minimum standards.http://landingoa.com/propertiespulse/fckeditorimages/br50-motorola-manual.xml
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As such, compliance with these conditions is mandatory; and As such, compliance with these conditions is mandatory. Canadian air operators, private operators and their pilots are only authorized to conduct RGR take-offs when complying with these conditions, as well as the limitations and procedures stipulated in the above-noted TC approved Supplements to the DHC-6 AFM. Instead, it now requires compliance with any limitation specified in the AFM; For the DHC-6, this is the left engine. For the purpose of this AC, “V MCA ” will be utilized.A flight simulation training device (FSTD) must be specifically validated and approved by TC for flight training as stipulated in Appendix A, Paragraphs (m) and (s) of this AC. (See also RGR Procedural Training) A flight simulation training device (FSTD) must be specifically validated and approved by TC for procedural training as described in Appendix A, Paragraphs (m) and (s) of this AC. (See also RGR Flight Training) Special Authorizations are included as part of the Operations Specifications. These unapproved, legacy MPS procedures are now obsolete and are no longer authorized for use. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory for air operators, private operators and pilots conducting RGR take-offs. To facilitate cross-reference, the guidance in Appendix B utilizes the same numbering as the conditions in Appendix A. It also serves as an aid to Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) personnel for certification and safety oversight purposes. This AC will remain in effect for information purposes until further notice. This guidance shall include, but is not limited to:This shall include, but is not limited to the following:This additional training shall be recorded.http://alansh.com/pic/br600ci-in-user-manual.xml The minimum requirements to conduct RGR training include the following:The value for ASD published in the approved RGR Take-off AFMS is to be used as a guide to ensure that a suitable area for a forced landing is available if a rejected take-off is initiated while airborne prior to V 1. A suitable area for a forced landing can be understood to be an area that provides the flight crew with reasonable capability to land the aircraft without damage to equipment or injury to persons. The value for accelerate-go published in the approved RGR Take-off AFMS is to be used as a guide to ensure that a suitable area is available, clear of obstacles along the take-off path, to continue the take-off if an engine fails at V 1. Therefore, air operators, private operators and pilots must consider and allow for degradation in take-off performance arising from the unique characteristics of each runway (take-off surface) at which an RGR take-off is conducted. This is a limitation specified in the approved RGR Take-off AFMS. Having two pilots facilitates the immediate recognition and announcement of an engine failure by the PM as well as the prompt reaction by the PF. These include, but are not limited to:Therefore, RGR flight instructors must perform three vitally important functions:The requirements specified for RGR take-off flight instructors, which are described below, would also be suitable criteria for ground instructors. Flight crews must have a thorough understanding of the reasons to conduct a rejected take-off:This is particularly important when conducting the procedure for Engine Failure Airborne, Prior to V 1. The value for ASD published in the approved RGR Take-off Supplement to the DHC-6 AFM is to be used as a guide to ensure that a suitable area for a forced landing is available if a rejected take-off is initiated while airborne prior to V 1.http://www.drupalitalia.org/node/76991 Therefore, pilots must understand the need to allow for degradation in take-off performance arising from the unique characteristics of each runway (take-off surface) at which an RGR take-off is conducted. During this period it will be necessary to qualify instructors to teach the new, approved RGR procedures.Towards this end, instructors should reference the manufacturer’s guidance for specific criteria to be used in the assessment of RGR normal and emergency procedures. For guidance in achieving the required proficiency, the matrix below provides recommendations for the minimum number of each manoeuvre which should be conducted in an aeroplane or flight simulation training device (FSTD):In particular, all personnel:These include, but are not limited to recommendations respecting:These risks include, but are not necessarily limited to:The decision to conduct training for rejected take-offs in an aeroplane is at the discretion of the air operator or private air operator, and must be made in consideration of the factors listed above, and must also consider the experience level of the pilot conducting training and the pilot being trained. Instead, the pilot conducting training should verbally prompt the pilot trainee to conduct the rejected take-off by calling “reject” (or whatever equivalent term has been adopted). This training should include a simulated failure of the critical (left) engine. These may include:They may, for example, be conducted on a hard surface runway during a positioning flight, since there is no requirement for these take-offs to be conducted from an unprepared surface. During this period it will be necessary to qualify instructors to teach the new, approved RGR procedures.Air operators, private operators, pilots and flight dispatchers are responsible for compliance with all relevant provisions. Amphibious or straight models are available for the DHC-6. With a full service refinishing and interiors department we can get her looking good as new.https://codicicolori.com/images/bounty-hunter-lone-star-metal-detector-owners-manual.pdf While she’s here our maintenance team will get her running at the top of her game and with an avionics upgrade you’ll be enjoying your air time even more! Combine this powerful twin-engine aircraft with a set of rugged Wipline 13000 floats and you have an aircraft that will take your operation to the next level. CAPTCHA Source Select a modification below to learn more! CAPTCHA Source. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. This report is not created for use in the context of legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. See Ownership and use of content. As the aircraft was climbing through 100 feet above ground level, an elevator control cable broke. The aircraft pitched to a nose-up attitude, stalled, and descended to the surface of the water. The captain, who was seriously injured, escaped from the sinking wreckage; the first officer and the two passengers drowned. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and sank. The corrosion was not detected by the maintenance personnel during the aircraft's last cable inspection. This was the second leg of a flight which had originated at Port Hardy.The captain occupied the right pilot seat. The pilots were unable to regain control of the aircraft, and it crashed into the water about 100 feet from the shore and sank immediately. The first officer and the two passengers remained in the aircraft and drowned. A search pilot spotted debris in the water near the logging camp at about 1430 Pacific daylight saving time (PDT) Footnote 2 that day. He landed to investigate, found the captain on the shore nearby, and transported him to the Port Hardy hospital. He began his career as an aircraft maintenance engineer (AME) in 1975 and he had worked for a number of employers on a wide range of aircraft types, including the DHC-6 in 1980.https://www.mybizwebsites.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/162749929e04f1---brother-dh4-b980-manual.pdf Duties of the Quality Manager include ensuring that all the work done in the shops or on the aircraft is carried out in accordance with applicable standards, practices, and specifications, and ensuring this manual and all technical publications are amended in a timely manner as required. He had been with the company for about eight years at the time of the accident. He was certified and qualified to conduct the Equal Maintenance for Maximum Availability (EMMA) number 18 inspection in accordance with existing regulations. However, he did not have a clear recollection of their contents. Weather was not a factor in this accident.Except for the failed elevator cable, no defects were found. However, during the wreckage recovery, the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was found loose in the aft baggage compartment. There was no sign of impact damage to the ELT case, and no indication of any marks on the ELT case which might have been caused by release from its securing bracket. The antenna connector was undamaged and found not connected to the ELT. No damage was noted to either the connection between the antenna connector and the antenna cable, or to the antenna cable itself. The ribbon antenna on the ELT had extended and the external ELT switch was found in the armed position. The ELT's internal g-switch was examined and found in the untripped position.He was barely able to swim to shore. The first officer and the passengers also sustained serious and disabling injuries at impact, and they did not escape from the sinking aircraft.It was not determined whether their use would have prevented the occupants' drowning. Although the aircraft crew seats were equipped with shoulder harnesses, neither the captain nor the first officer was wearing one. An Inspection Program Approval (IPA) for this aircraft type was approved by Transport Canada (TC) on 06 June 1994.www.drpaullampl.com/userfiles/files/canon-pixma-mp530-service-manual-download.pdf The program is described as follows: Periodic inspections are performed in accordance with the standards of Chapter 571 and this approved inspection program. All work is performed in accordance with the manufacturer's maintenance manuals or other data that is acceptable or approved by Transport Canada (TC). In this system, a number of individual work cards are specified for every 100-hour inspection, each addressing a separate area of inspection on the aircraft. This is the location of the cable group at station 376.The inspection of control cables is routine, and all licensed AMEs would be very familiar with the task. In addition, de Havilland maintenance manual PSM 1-6-2 contains a section that provides brief, general instructions on the inspection of control cables. The control column must be moved in a fore and aft direction by another person at the front of the aircraft when the cables are being inspected so that a length of cable on both sides of the pulley can be viewed. In accordance with EMMA procedures, the cable inspection is required every 800 hours for aircraft in normal service, and every 400 hours whenever a cargo of livestock or corrosive material is regularly transported. The cables had no fixed service life. It arrived with 20,667.4 hours total time since new (TTSN). The maintenance records received from the previous owners and operators were not complete. Consequently, the installation date(s) of the control cables could not be determined. The aft baggage area floor was removed and the area was pressure washed; the control cables were lubricated and the floor was reinstalled. Other maintenance included painting the aircraft exterior, replacing the cabin interior, and replacing a cracked rudder pedal. Additionally, the area under the baggage compartment floor was cleaned and treated with a corrosion-preventive substance, and corroded screws were replaced with stainless steel screws.https://frasertechno.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16274994480194---brother-deluxe-1350-typewriter-manual.pdf This was the first EMMA inspection completed after the aircraft was purchased by Pacific Coastal Airlines. He did recall, however, that another engineer had moved the controls for him while he examined the cables, and that he had lubricated the cables with a common corrosion-preventive lubricant. He also recalled inspecting the de-ice boot ejectors and recording the ELT number; these items are located at the rear of the aft fuselage. This was about 68 hours since the last cable inspection, and 202.6 hours since arriving at Pacific Coastal's base in Port Hardy. The break occurred at the station 376 pulley cluster, and the frayed ends of the broken cable had chafed the paint from the pulley bracket before the cable broke.The cables had been immersed in sea water during the period that the aircraft was submerged and all exhibited the effects of salt water corrosion. As the corrosion progressed, individual wires and strands started failing and the wire ends caused paint removal in the surrounding bracket. It is believed that moisture collected on the pulley and provided the catalyst for corrosion to take place.The stainless steel cables are used by some DHC-6 operators and are specified by de Havilland for some applications; however, they are prone to increased wear and require replacement more frequently than the carbon steel cables. Stainless steel cables were not a requirement for this aircraft. In addition, at the company's request, TC System Safety Directorate completed a safety review of the company during that time. The company was maintaining sea-planes, based at Port Hardy, by a method that was not described in their Maintenance Control Manual. Additionally, the company's copy of the Air Regulations and Air Navigation Orders did not have current amendments.http://leap-egypt.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/162749952dcffd---brother-disney-se-270d-manual.pdf In a summary letter regarding the audit, the audit team concluded as follows: The company is not in compliance with the approved policies, procedures and control systems which provide guidance to company personnel. The deficiencies in operational control, maintenance management and quality control are below the standard required of an Operating Certificate holder. The audit team concluded as follows: It is believed that moisture collected on the pulley and provided the catalyst for corrosion to take place. Attesting to this are several similar instances of control cable failures. Two possibilities were considered: first, that the procedures and requirements for inspecting the control cables were inadequate, and second, that the personnel who conducted the inspections did not exercise due diligence in the performance of those inspections. The cable installed in the accident aircraft met the de Havilland specification and, although some operators use corrosion-resistant stainless steel cables on this and other aircraft types, such cables were not required on this aircraft type. The EMMA number 18 inspection procedure has been proven effective by other aircraft companies in detecting corroded control cables. (See Appendix B.) Following the procedure as laid out in the EMMA number 18 work card, the AME did not remove the aft baggage compartment floor to provide access to both sides of the station 376 pulley group. Nevertheless, when the controls were cycled to the full extent of their travel, it should have been possible for the AME to detect any frayed or discoloured cables. Although he was experienced with the inspection procedure and was aware of control cable failures due to corrosion, it could not be determined with what diligence he performed the inspection. Airworthiness audits had been conducted, and although some problems had been identified, these had been rectified to the satisfaction of Transport Canada.www.dqnjl.com/userfiles/files/canon-pixma-mp530-printer-manual.pdf The corrosion was not detected by the maintenance personnel during the aircraft's last cable inspection. The service letter advised those operators of existing information regarding cable failures, and noted the following. It is the operator's responsibility to utilize both microfiche and any hard copy revision when maintaining their aircraft, to ensure that they are using the latest information available. Based upon this understanding, the operator should initiate a detailed inspection of the aircraft prior to entering it into service. It lists increased corrosion inspection requirements for the elevator and rudder control cables. Most significantly, this revision announces the requirement to replace the control cables every 12 months. Previously, control cables were replaced when their condition warranted. There was no fixed service life. In addition, it requires the replacement of the elevator and rudder control cables below the baggage compartment floor if a spill occurs. It lists increased corrosion inspection requirements for the elevator and rudder control cables. Like revision 73, this revision announces the requirement to replace the control cables every 12 months. In addition, it includes instructions for the amendment of the EMMA work cards. In addition, NOTES are added that require the replacement of all (including aileron) control cables installed in land planes every 60 months; the NOTES also advise that stainless steel control cables are available. The controls should be moved to ensure that no segment of a cable is left uninspected. If suspect, the cable should be removed for a more thorough examination. Furthermore, if the aircraft operates in (or has operated in) a corrosive environment, or carries (or has carried) corrosive cargo, the frequency of inspection should be increased according to the manufacturer's recommendations. Consequently, the Board, consisting of Chairperson Benoit Bouchard, and members Maurice Harquail, Charles Simpson and W.A. Tadros, authorized the release of this report on 21 May 1997. The corrosion failure of that cable was believed to be due to drippings, over some time period, from corrosive cargoes placed over the pulley area.In that occurrence, an elevator cable was found to be corroded and broken at Station 376. The broken cable was examined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) laboratory in Washington, District of Columbia.Both aircraft involved in these occurrences had been operating in a salt-water environment. None of the occurrences resulted in aircraft damage or injury. Time in service of the failed cables varied. The cable had failed at the same pulley group location (Station 376) as on the occurrence aircraft. The report made the following conclusions: In this instance, the rogue strands in the cable were not present, and the report concluded as follows: An investigation is presently under way to determine the cause. Corrosion has occurred at or near a pulley at the low point of the cable run. In addition, destructive inspection has shown that in some cases, there have been inclusions of non-standard material within the cable. Owners operating aircraft in a salt water environment should inspect their aircraft for corrosion of cables at the These include the following. JavaScript is used to display processing date.However, this data alone does not provide the basis for a determination regarding the airworthiness of an aircraft or the current aircraft configuration. For specific information, you may request a copy of the aircraft record at. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see a list of open tasks. To use this banner, please see the full instructions.If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see lists of open tasks and task forces. To use this banner, please see the full instructions. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks. There are 584 Twin Otters flying as of August 2007. Someone had listed about 350, this might be correct as the quantity in airline service, but if you include the entire fleet (skydive, privately owned, government, etc.) there are 584. The first engine fitted was a PT6A-20, this was a 550 HP engine. The Series 300 uses the -27 engine, this is a 680 HP engine but it is flat rated (limited) to 620 HP when installed on the Twin Otter, primarily to keep the Vmc down to an acceptable level. The aircraft is legally limited to 19 passengers (anything more than 19 requires a flight attendant be on board in most jurisdictions) - therefore, if skydiving clubs are lifting more than this, it would be wise for them to not brag about it here on Wikipedia. The first pre-production prototype of the Series 400 aircraft is now being being built at Viking Air in Sidney, BC and is expected to fly in the late spring of 2008. FYI I am the engineering test pilot for the Series 400 - I work for Viking.Currently, there are 276 incidents recorded in the Aviation Safety Network database for the Twin Otter and, obviously, it would be impractical to list them all on this Wikipedia page. If so, what guidelines should be used in deciding which incidents are worth noting?MilborneOne ( talk ) 17:58, 11 April 2008 (UTC)The Aviation Safety Network database lists 243 hull losses and (if I counted correctly) 159 fatal accidents since 1967. Having an inclusion guideline doesnt allways follow that everything that qualifies should be added, I would like to think a level of common sense still applies. But it does give weight from consensus for excluding the more simple non-fatal and non-notable accidents and incidents from being added. MilborneOne ( talk ) 21:47, 11 April 2008 (UTC) MilborneOne ( talk ) 16:25, 25 June 2014 (UTC) So plan on about 2045 for the article's name change.:) THe Dash 8 was only recently moved from De Havilland Canada to Bombardier, tho the latter has been producing it for well over 10 years. Another option is that Viking's variants start differing a lot from the DHC's, or when the article's coverage on the Viking starts to overshadow the DHCs, then we put the Viking variants on a new page. For now, tho, it's probably best to leave page as is. We should set up redirects at the most likely names to be searched, such as Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter, Viking DHC-6, and Viking Twin Otter. - BillCJ ( talk ) 01:18, 23 June 2008 (UTC) Even though the type certificate for the aircraft is now owned by Viking Air, and the aircraft is now back in production at Viking Air, all but one of the changes between de Havilland production (which ended in 1988) and Viking production (which began in 2008) are all considered 'minor' by Transport Canada, the certification authority. The only change that is considered 'major' is the updating of the avionics suite. It is, however, reasonable to assume that if the Twin Otter had remained in continuous production, the avionics would have evolved to what Viking is putting into the aircraft today. FYI, I need to declare a potential conflict of interest here - I work for Viking, and I am the person responsible for the design of the new flight compartment.:) PanEuropean FYI, you might want to review the WP Conflict of Interest Policy and Reliable sources, if you've not read them already. Two areas I see that you can be of great use in is fact-checking, or spotting errors form other sources, and in supplying photos. First-hand photos are actually encouraged for copyright reasons, as most aircraft companies are still reluctant to release photos free of copyright restrictions. Also, I've found that many editors enjoy hearing anecdotes from company insiders.As I stated above, when the article's coverage on the Viking starts to overshadow the DHCs, it might be time to put the Viking variants on a new page. With some more info and photos such as what you've been adding, along with more contributions by other editors, I can see that happening fairly quickly. I'll try to set up the redirects shortly, but I would like to know what name Viking is using for the aircraft in its publications: Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter, Viking DHC-6, Viking Twin Otter, something else, or a combination of these in different contexts. If we do set up a new article for the 400, we need to pick the name most likey to be used in a search, or the one that the company most often uses, whichever fits best. Thanks again! - BillCJ ( talk ) 05:14, 5 October 2008 (UTC) Still seems weird to me that new planes are being built and flown, but the article still refers to the out-of-production name from 20 years ago. Compare that to the Sears Tower article, which was renamed when the building was, even though it was known by the original name for decades. Ah well. Greg Salter ( talk ) 13:02, 21 January 2010 (UTC) MilborneOne ( talk ) 13:46, 21 January 2010 (UTC) How about we rename it to just DHC-6 Twin Otter, so it covers everything. Greg Salter ( talk ) 01:18, 1 October 2016 (UTC). Fact of the matter is that there has never been an upper or a lower temperature limitation published in any of the Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFMs) or maintenance manuals for operation of the legacy (1988 and prior production) aircraft. The certification regulations that were in force at the time these legacy aircraft were granted type certificates did not require maximum and minimum operating temperature limitations to be published. PanEuropean ( talk ) 06:49, 21 October 2008 (UTC)However, all 3 will be out of service shortly. The aircraft are no longer used in Coastal Surveillance since the introduction of the Dash 8 aircraft. Tail Numbers and registration are as follows; 454 C-FCSX, 457 C-FCSU, 459 C-FCSW. If you wish to verify these, the registry is listed on the web for anyone to view: MilborneOne ( talk ) 18:59, 6 July 2011 (UTC) Nmac-YK ( talk ) 11:42, 9 September 2010 (UTC)PanEuropean ( talk ) 19:08, 18 September 2010 (UTC)One of the links ( ) is SO amazingly inaccurate and unrealistic as to be laughable. It says, among other things, that the passenger capacity is about 40 seats, and that the current NEW YORK-based manufacturer is in danger of folding. Heck, it doesn't once name Viking or any other manufacturer. The other link is dead but I found the article anyway ( ), and it says the deal is with cooperation with the manufacturer.Anyone against this. Greg Salter ( talk ) 03:28, 23 November 2011 (UTC)Greg Salter ( talk ) 20:02, 23 June 2012 (UTC). I suggest to leave here just the most significant users (how to ascertain that?), and add a wikilink to the proposed list of users. Please let me know your thoughts, I'm happy to do the work in the next couple weeks.MilborneOne ( talk ) 09:43, 22 December 2013 (UTC) I'll start working on this list article if possible today. Regards, DPdH ( talk ) 10:13, 22 December 2013 (UTC)MilborneOne ( talk ) 13:33, 22 December 2013 (UTC) And the conversation above says there had been 276 incidents up to 2008 (the source given has 270 hull losses now, out of 353 incidents altogether). So is that a lot? The article also says there are about 900 in service, and its been around for 50 years now, so 270 crashes is about 5 a year (and they fly mainly in difficult terrain) but aircraft crashes usually seem (to the general public) to be a rarity. So is it (like the plethora of DC-3 crashes after the war, which were big news at the time) just an artifact of there being so many about, or is it (like the German Starfighter crashes in the 60's) a symptom of something a bit wrong. Do we need a paragraph in the Accident section explaining this.